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A FIRST AMENDMENT PERSPECTIVE ON 
THE CONSTRUCTION OF THIRD-PARTY 
COPYRIGHT LIABILITY 
Alfred C. Yen* 
Abstract: Third-party copyright liability raises specific First Amendment 
problems that remain relatively unexplored. Among other things, such li-
ability separates the danger of liability from the benefits of speaking, mak-
ing key actors prone to careless censorship of speech. This Article applies 
the First Amendment to third-party copyright liability by drawing lessons 
from the famous cases of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan and Gertz v. Robert 
Welch, Inc. It concludes that vicarious liability should be sharply curtailed, 
and that the application of presumed damages is constitutionally prob-
lematic in many contributory liability cases. 
Introduction 
 This Article offers preliminary thoughts about the application of 
the First Amendment to third-party copyright liability. Many authors 
have analyzed the overall relationship between copyright and the First 
Amendment,1 but the First Amendment problems raised specifically by 
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1 See, e.g., David L. Lange & H. Jefferson Powell, No Law: Intellectual Prop-
erty in the Image of an Absolute First Amendment (2009); C. Edwin Baker, First 
Amendment Limits on Copyright, 55 Vand. L. Rev. 891 (2002); Yochai Benkler, Free as the 
Air to Common Use: First Amendment Constraints on Enclosure of the Public Domain, 74 N.Y.U. L. 
Rev. 354 (1999); Robert C. Denicola, Copyright and Free Speech: Constitutional Limita-
tions on the Protection of Expression, 67 Cal. L. Rev. 283 (1979); Paul Goldstein, Copy-
right and the First Amendment, 70 Colum. L. Rev. 983, 1029 (1970); Mark A. Lemley & 
Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Injunctions in Intellectual Property Cases, 48 Duke 
L.J. 147 (1998); Neil Weinstock Netanel, Locating Copyright Within the First Amendment 
Skein, 54 Stan. L. Rev. 1, 7 (2001); Melville B. Nimmer, Does Copyright Abridge the First 
Amendment Guarantees of Free Speech and Press?, 17 UCLA L. Rev. 1180, 1183 (1970); L. Ray 
Patterson, Free Speech, Copyright, and Fair Use, 40 Vand. L. Rev. 1 (1987); Pamela 
Samuelson, Reviving Zacchini: Analyzing First Amendment Defenses in Right of Publicity and 
Copyright Cases, 57 Tul. L. Rev. 836 (1983); Lionel S. Sobel, Copyright and the First 
Amendment: A Gathering Storm?, 19 Copyright L. Symp. (ASCAP) 43 (1971); Alfred C. Yen, 
A First Amendment Perspective on the Idea/Expression Dichotomy and Copyright in a Work’s “Total 
Concept and Feel,” 38 Emory L.J. 393 (1989); Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, Information as 
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third-party copyright liability remain essentially unexplored.2 This si-
lence is perhaps explained by the judiciary’s general view that copyright 
does not raise serious First Amendment concerns. Copyright unques-
tionably restricts speech. When an individual prints a book, performs 
music for others, or posts content on a web page, she clearly engages in 
speech protected by the First Amendment. Nevertheless, despite the 
First Amendment’s admonition that Congress shall make “no law” 
abridging freedom of speech,3 copyright does precisely that by making 
it generally illegal for an individual to engage in certain speech activi-
ties with works whose copyright is owned by someone else.4 Many have 
suggested that the First Amendment affects the scope of copyright,5 but 
courts do not agree.6 Court after court has stated that copyright raises 
few, if any, First Amendment problems because copyright encourages 
the production of speech.7 To the extent that copyright occasionally 
                                                                                                                      
Speech, Information as Goods: Some Thoughts on Marketplaces and the Bill of Rights, 33 Wm. & 
Mary L. Rev. 665 (1992). 
2 See Alfred C. Yen, Internet Service Provider Liability for Subscriber Copyright Infringement, 
Enterprise Liability, and the First Amendment, 88 Geo. L.J. 1833, 1870–72 (2000) (evaluating 
vicarious and contributory copyright liability in light of the First Amendment). 
3 U.S. Const. amend. I. 
4 Copyright reserves to copyright holders the following exclusive rights: 
(1) to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords; 
(2) to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work; 
(3) to distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the pub-
lic by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending; 
(4) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works, pan-
tomimes, and motion pictures and other audiovisual works, to perform the 
copyrighted work publicly; 
(5) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works, pan-
tomimes, and pictorial, graphic, or sculptural works, including the individual 
images of a motion picture or other audiovisual work, to display the copy-
righted work publicly; and 
(6) in the case of sound recordings, to perform the copyrighted work publicly 
by means of a digital audio transmission. 
17 U.S.C. § 106 (2006). 
5 See supra note 1. 
6 See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 218–19 (2003) (refusing to subject the Copyright 
Term Extension Act to First Amendment scrutiny); see also David S. Olson, First Amendment 
Interests and Copyright Accommodations, 50 B.C. L. Rev. 1393, 1397 (2009) (discussing the 
courts’ reluctance to restrain copyright by the First Amendment and calling for courts to 
read more accommodations into copyright law to protect important speech interests). 
7 See Eldred, 537 U.S. at 219 (noting that copyright encourages the production of 
speech and contains safeguards that reduce conflict with the First Amendment); Harper & 
Row Publishers, Inc. v Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 558 (1985) (“[T]he Framers intended 
copyright itself to be the engine of free expression. By establishing a marketable right to 
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runs the risk of suppressing speech in a constitutionally problematic 
way, doctrines such as the idea/expression dichotomy and fair use en-
sure that copyright does not expand to the point where First Amend-
ment objections become real.8 
 Even if the foregoing establishes copyright’s general First Amend-
ment compatibility, it does not properly account for peculiar free 
speech problems associated with third-party copyright liability. In par-
ticular, third-party copyright liability increases copyright’s chilling of 
expression by separating the benefits of speaking from the burdens of 
liability. This chilling effect changes the incentives faced by key actors 
in ways that encourage the suppression of speech. 
 Consider, for example, a newspaper accused of infringement for 
posting on its website a book review that contains a long quote.9 A 
newspaper in this position must decide whether to remove the review 
from its website. In doing so, it will weigh the risk of liability and the 
cost of defending itself against the value gained from continuing to 
speak. For purposes of contrast, consider the Internet service provider 
accused of third-party copyright infringement because it operates the 
server where the newspaper posted the book review. In deciding 
whether to remove the book review from the Internet, the service pro-
vider will consider the likelihood of liability and the cost of defense, but 
no countervailing value related to the service provider’s own speech 
will offset these potential costs, for that value is enjoyed by the user, not 
the service provider.10 Accordingly, the service provider will be more 
                                                                                                                      
the use of one’s expression, copyright supplies the economic incentive to create and dis-
seminate ideas.”). 
8 See, e.g., Eldred, 537 U.S. at 198 (indicating that copyright law does not generally pose 
a conflict with the First Amendment); Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 555–60 (rejecting the 
First Amendment as a limit on copyright); New Era Publ’ns. Int’l, ApS v. Henry Holt & 
Co., 873 F.2d 576, 584 (2d Cir. 1989) (“The fair use doctrine encompasses all claims of first 
amendment in the copyright field.”); Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prod., Inc. v. McDon-
ald’s Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1170 (9th Cir. 1977) (“[T]he idea-expression dichotomy al-
ready serves to accommodate the competing interests of copyright and the first amend-
ment.”). 
9 Such a use may or may not be infringement. Although it involves reproducing a por-
tion of a copyrighted text, the fair use doctrine arguably excuses any infringement. See 17 
U.S.C. § 107 (2006) (identifying criticism and comment as purposes justifying fair use 
treatment, depending on several factors, including the amount of borrowing and the ef-
fect on the market for the copyrighted work); see also Harper & Row, 471 U.S. 539 (analyz-
ing whether fair use protects a news article discussing and quoting from Gerald Ford’s 
memoirs). 
10 In theory, a service provider might worry that unwarranted removal of a user’s con-
tent could be the basis for a breach of contract suit. A properly drafted service agreement, 
however, would likely offer complete protection from such liability. 
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willing to remove the accused book review from the Internet than the 
newspaper would be, and indeed most third-party defendants are 
quicker to suppress speech than primary speakers.11 
 The relatively high risk of chilling expression associated with third-
party copyright liability suggests that the First Amendment is particu-
larly relevant to the proper construction of this area of law. Indeed, as 
the following pages show, First Amendment principles have a great deal 
to say about the use of vicarious liability, contributory liability, and in-
ducement, as well as the appropriateness of presumed damages in 
third-party copyright liability. This analysis requires two steps. First, this 
Article describes the present contours of third-party copyright liability 
and the open questions that might be influenced by First Amendment 
concerns.12 Second, it connects the construction of third-party copy-
right liability to the chilling of speech.13 In doing so, the Article uses 
insights borrowed from New York Times Co. v. Sullivan and Gertz v. Robert 
Welch, Inc. to answer some of the open questions concerning the con-
struction of third-party copyright liability.14 Among other things, this 
Article argues that the First Amendment requires a narrow application 
of vicarious liability and that presumed damages cannot be granted in 
many cases of contributory liability.15 
                                                                                                                      
11 A good example of such willingness was the dispute between Professor Wendy Seltzer 
and the National Football League (“NFL”) over Professor Seltzer’s posting of a short clip 
from an NFL game displaying the NFL’s broad copyright claims to the video-sharing website 
YouTube. See Jacqui Chen, NFL Fumbles Takedown Battle, Ars Technica, Mar. 20, 2007, 
http://arstechnica.com/business/news/2007/03/nfl-fumbles-dmca-takedown-battle-could-
face-sanctions.ars. The NFL immediately complained to YouTube, and YouTube promptly 
disabled access to Professor Seltzer’s posting despite the strong likelihood that Professor 
Seltzer’s posting constituted fair use. Id. If the NFL had complained instead to Professor 
Seltzer, it seems certain that Professor Seltzer would not have been as accommodating. See id. 
Indeed, she protested the NFL’s action to YouTube in order to get her posting restored. See 
id. 
12 See infra notes 16–97 and accompanying text. 
13 See infra notes 98–133 and accompanying text. 
14 See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 
376 U.S. 254 (1964). The author previously suggested using these cases to limit third-party 
copyright liability. See Yen, supra note 2, at 1870–72. Rebecca Tushnet has also recently 
suggested the applicability of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan and its progeny to third-party 
liability. See Rebecca Tushnet, Power Without Responsibility: Intermediaries and the First Amend-
ment, 76 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 986, 1007 n.93 (2008) (stating that the reasoning of New York 
Times Co. v. Sullivan “supports rules that give intermediaries some extra protection against 
liability”). 
15 See infra notes 98–133 and accompanying text. 
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I. The Law of Third-Party Copyright Liability 
 The present Copyright Act does not explicitly create causes of ac-
tion for third-party copyright liability.16 Courts have, however, used 
principles derived from the common law of tort to create three distinct 
causes of action for such liability: vicarious liability, contributory liabil-
ity, and intentional inducement.17 Each cause of action comes from dif-
ferent lines of case law.18 As this section shows, certain interpretations 
of the law will likely increase the chilling effect on speech associated 
with third-party copyright liability.19 
A. Vicarious Liability 
 In 1963, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit’s deci-
sion in Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. H.L. Green Co., supplied the modern 
elements of vicarious copyright liability.20 In that case, the defendant, 
H.L. Green Company, operated a chain of department stores.21 Green 
hired the Jalen Amusement Company as the concessionaire operating 
the music record departments in these stores.22 The relationship be-
tween Green and Jalen was fairly close.23 Jalen and its employees fol-
lowed Green’s policies, and Green had the authority to discharge 
Jalen’s personnel.24 Jalen deposited its receipts into Green’s cash regis-
ters, and Green took the money.25 Green then deducted its ten to 
twelve percent commission, the salaries of Jalen’s employees, and taxes 
before returning any balance to Jalen.26 Customers buying records re-
                                                                                                                      
16 See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 434 (1984) (“The 
Copyright Act does not expressly render anyone liable for infringement committed by 
another.”). 
17 See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 941 (2005) (es-
tablishing intentional inducement as a cause of action); Gershwin Publ’g Co. v. Columbia 
Artists Mgmt., Inc., 443 F.2d 1159, 1162 (2d Cir. 1971) (establishing contributory liability 
as a cause of action); Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. H.L. Green Co., 316 F.2d 304, 308 (2d 
Cir. 1963) (establishing vicarious liability as a cause of action). 
18 See generally Alfred C. Yen, Third-Party Copyright Liability After Grokster, 91 Minn. L. 
Rev. 184 (2006) (providing a more detailed description of these causes of action); Yen, 
supra note 2 (same). 
19 See infra notes 20–97 and accompanying text. 
20 316 F.2d at 307. 
21 Id. at 306. 
22 Id. 
23 Id. 
24 Id. 
25 Id. 
26 Shapiro, 316 F.2d at 306. 
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ceived receipts from Green with no mention of Jalen.27 Unfortunately, 
some of the records sold by Jalen were infringing counterfeits.28 The 
plaintiffs sued Green, contending that Green was liable for Jalen’s in-
fringement.29 
 The district court ruled in Green’s favor,30 but the Second Circuit 
reversed.31 In deciding for the plaintiffs, the Second Circuit wrote: 
When the right and ability to supervise coalesce with an obvi-
ous and direct financial interest in the exploitation of copy-
righted materials—even in the absence of actual knowledge 
that the copyright monopoly is being impaired—the purposes 
of copyright law may be best effectuated by the imposition of 
liability upon the beneficiary of that exploitation.32 
Given the close relationship between Green and Jalen, liability quickly 
followed.33 Courts generally credit the above-quoted passage from 
Shapiro as the source of the two elements that govern vicarious copy-
right liability today: some level of control over another’s infringement 
and a financial interest in that infringement.34 
 It is important to understand that vicarious copyright liability does 
not measure whether a defendant behaved culpably. The elements of 
control and financial interest measure whether a defendant’s relation-
ship to an infringer is sufficiently close to justify holding the defendant 
responsible for the infringer’s behavior.35 This does not mean that the 
defendant did anything wrong. There is nothing inherently unreason-
able about having a close relationship with someone who happens to 
commit copyright infringement. Accordingly, vicarious liability merely 
reflects a judgment that it is fair to hold the defendant liable or that 
such liability would serve social goals of preventing infringement and 
raising compensation.36 To borrow from the language of torts, vicarious 
copyright liability is a form of strict liability.37 
                                                                                                                      
27 Id. at 305–06. 
28 Id. 
29 Id. at 306. 
30 Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. H.L. Green Co., 135 U.S.P.Q. 181, 182 (S.D.N.Y. 1962). 
31 Shapiro, 316 F.2d at 307. 
32 Id. (internal citations omitted). 
33 Id. at 308–09. 
34See Banff Ltd. v. Limited, Inc., 869 F. Supp. 1103, 1107 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (identifying 
Shapiro as the leading case on vicarious copyright liability). 
35 Cf. Shapiro, 316 F.2d at 308. 
36 See Lisa M. v. Henry Mayo Newhall Mem’l Hosp., 907 P.2d 358, 366 (Cal. 1995) (adopt-
ing this explanation for strict liability); Huddleston ex rel. Huddleston v. Union Rural Elec. 
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 The principal controversy in the law of vicarious copyright liability 
concerns its scope. Some courts have taken Shapiro’s precise formula-
tion rather seriously, holding liable only those defendants who have 
close control over an infringer’s behavior and take a portion of the in-
fringer’s actual sales. For example, in the 1994 case Artists Music, Inc. v. 
Reed Publishing, Inc., heard by the U.S. District Court for the Southern 
District of New York, the defendant Reed Publishing organized a trade 
show at which it rented booths to various exhibitors, some of whom al-
legedly made unauthorized use of music in their displays.38 The plain-
tiffs sued to hold Reed vicariously liable for any infringement,39 but the 
court decided in Reed’s favor at summary judgment.40 In so deciding, 
the court rejected the plaintiff’s entirely plausible interpretation of 
control and financial interest.41 The defendant arguably had control 
because it could have prohibited the use of music by exhibitors or 
monitored such use.42 The plaintiffs also argued that the defendant 
had a financial interest in the underlying infringements because music 
made the exhibits more attractive, thereby increasing the show’s paid 
attendance and the defendant’s revenue.43 The court rejected these 
arguments, stating that control required more than the simple ability to 
prohibit generally the use of music and that financial interest required 
a cut of actual revenue, as opposed to a general business-related bene-
fit.44 
                                                                                                                      
Ass’n, 841 P.2d 282, 287 (Colo. 1992) (en banc) (same); Bair v. Peck, 811 P.2d 1176, 1182 
(Kan. 1991) (same); Adams v. N.Y. City Transit Auth., 666 N.E.2d 216, 218 (N.Y. 1996) (same). 
37 See Yen, supra note 2, at 1859. 
38 See Artists Music, 31 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1624–25, 1627. 
39 Id. at 1625–26. 
40 Id. at 1627. 
41 Id. at 1626–27. 
42 Id. 
43 Id. 
44 Artists Music, 31 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1627. Other courts have taken a similar view. See Elli-
son v. Robertson, 357 F.3d 1072, 1079 (9th Cir. 2004) (finding no vicarious liability against 
Internet service provider for allowing subscribers access to infringing copies of the plain-
tiff’s work posted by a third party who was not a subscriber); Goes Lithography Co. v. Banta 
Corp., 26 F. Supp. 2d 1042, 1045 (N.D. Ill. 1998) (holding that plaintiff failed to state a 
cause of action for vicarious copyright liability against parent corporation for infringement 
committed by its wholly owned subsidiary); Burdick v. Koerner, 988 F. Supp. 1206, 1210 
(E.D. Wisc. 1998) (“[T]he better-reasoned case law demonstrates that in order to establish 
vicarious liability in the context of a claim for copyright infringement, a plaintiff must 
introduce evidence beyond a defendant’s membership on a board of directors.”); Marobie-
FL Inc. v. Nat’l Ass’n of Fire Equip. Distribs., 983 F. Supp. 1167, 1179 (N.D. Ill. 1997) (find-
ing no vicarious liability against Internet service provider for infringing posting by its sub-
scriber); Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Commc’n Servs., 907 F. Supp. 1361, 1377 
(N.D. Cal. 1995) (same); Banff, 869 F. Supp. at 1110. 
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 Artists Music stands in sharp contrast to Polygram International Pub-
lishing, Inc. v. Nevada/TIG, Inc., a 1994 case decided by the U.S. District 
Court for the District of Massachusetts, in which the plaintiff, a copy-
right holder, similarly claimed that the operator of a large computer 
trade show was vicariously liable for infringing performances of music 
by exhibitors.45 Although the Polygram court found for the defendants 
because there was insufficient evidence of direct infringement,46 the 
court interpreted the law of vicarious liability in the plaintiff’s favor.47 
With respect to the right and ability to supervise, the Polygram court 
consciously rejected the proposition that a defendant had to have con-
trol over the “manner and means of performance.”48 Instead, the court 
endorsed the principle that the simple ability to veto the use of music 
by the primary infringer established the necessary control.49 The court 
went even further in interpreting the requirement of an “obvious and 
direct financial interest.” According to the court, the law permitted the 
imposition of vicarious liability on a showing of “either direct or indirect 
financial benefit.”50 This finding opened the door to the court’s con-
clusion that “commercial gain from the overall operation and either a 
direct or indirect financial benefit from the infringement itself” would 
support liability.51 The court reasoned that the defendant operated the 
trade show for profit, and that the performance of music by exhibitors 
made the show’s exhibits more attractive to the show’s attendees. 
Hence, the defendant had the necessary indirect financial interest.52 
 The different approaches outlined above have very different con-
sequences for third-party copyright liability and its associated chilling of 
expression. A third-party defendant facing vicarious liability can avoid 
adverse consequences only by preventing infringement. And because 
she does not reap any of the benefits from the speech, she has little rea-
son to avoid sweeping too broadly in order to avoid liability. Accord-
ingly, if courts take the narrower Artists Music approach to vicarious li-
ability, relatively few defendants have to worry about being vicariously 
responsible for the misdeeds of others, and fewer actors will take ag-
gressive, overbroad action against noninfringing speech. This will keep 
                                                                                                                      
45 See Polygram Int’l Publ’g, Inc. v. Nevada/TIG, Inc., 855 F. Supp. 1314, 1317 (D. 
Mass. 1994). 
46 Id. at 1323. 
47 Id. at 1328–33. 
48 Id. at 1326. 
49 Id. 
50 Polygram, 855 F. Supp. at 1326. 
51 Id. at 1331. 
52 Id. at 1331–33. 
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copyright’s chilling of expression relatively low. By contrast, if courts 
take the broader Polygram approach, more defendants will face liability 
and will therefore react by diligently suppressing all alleged infringing 
behavior with little regard for errors. Indeed, a defendant facing Poly-
gram-type liability might prohibit all use of music at its trade show, re-
gardless of whether the user had a license. This would increase copy-
right’s chilling effect.53 
B. Contributory Liability 
 In the 1971 case, Gershwin Publishing Corporation v. Columbia Artists 
Management, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit wrote, 
“[O]ne who, with knowledge of the infringing activity, induces, causes 
or materially contributes to the infringing conduct of another, may be 
held liable as a ‘contributory’ infringer.”54 Many courts have since adopted 
this formulation.55 The Gershwin court applied this formulation to im-
pose liability on Columbia Artists Management, a company that ar-
ranged performance opportunities for musicians.56 Columbia some-
times did this by helping local communities organize concert series into 
which Columbia would book its artists.57 Unfortunately, as Columbia 
knew, the local venues often did so without appropriate performance 
licenses.58 The Second Circuit found that such knowledge, combined 
with the assistance given to the concert organizers, established contribu-
tory liability.59 
 Over time, courts have distilled the Gershwin statement to give con-
tributory copyright liability two elements: knowledge and material con-
                                                                                                                      
53 Several courts have taken a similar approach, interpreting vicarious liability broadly. 
See A & M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1023–24 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding 
that having the ability to block users from accessing a system that allowed infringement 
and the role of music in attracting users to the system established the likelihood of vicari-
ous liability); Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259, 264 (9th Cir. 1996) (con-
cluding plaintiff stated an adequate claim against flea market operators despite not alleg-
ing knowledge of specific instances of infringement nor a direct financial interest); UMG 
Recordings, Inc. v. Sinnott, 300 F. Supp. 2d 993, 1001–02 (E.D. Cal. 2004) (granting sum-
mary judgment against flea-market operators for infringement committed by vendors at 
flea market). 
54 443 F.2d at 1162 (internal citation omitted). 
55 See Napster, 239 F.3d at 1019–20; Fonovisa, 76 F.3d at 264; Casella v. Morris, 820 F.2d 
362, 365 (11th Cir. 1987); A & M Records, Inc. v. Abdallah, 948 F. Supp. 1449, 1455 (C.D. 
Cal. 1996); Demetriades v. Kaufmann, 690 F. Supp. 289, 293 (S.D.N.Y. 1988). 
56 443 F.2d at 1160. 
57 Id. at 1161. 
58 See id. 
59 Id. at 1162–63. 
1490 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 50:1481 
tribution.60 These elements show that contributory liability operates on 
a theory different from vicarious liability. By imposing liability when the 
defendant knowingly contributes to infringement in a material way, 
contributory liability evaluates the culpability of a defendant’s behavior. 
Again, to borrow from tort law, this makes contributory liability a fault-
based, as opposed to strict liability, cause of action.61 
 As with vicarious liability, courts have interpreted contributory li-
ability in divergent ways, disagreeing primarily about the meaning of 
“knowledge.” Many courts interpret knowledge narrowly, limiting liabil-
ity to those defendants who have relatively detailed and specific infor-
mation about infringement that they support. For example, in the fa-
mous 1984 U.S. Supreme Court case, Sony v. Universal City Studios, the 
plaintiffs sued Sony for contributory liability on the ground that some 
consumers who purchased Sony Betamax videocassette recorders made 
infringing copies of the plaintiffs’ movies and television shows.62 With-
out question, Sony “knew” in the colloquial sense that some of its cus-
tomers would infringe copyrights, and its product clearly provided im-
portant support to these infringers.63 Nevertheless, the Court concluded 
that such knowledge was not enough to hold Sony liable for contribu-
tory infringement.64 According to the Court, sufficiently culpable intent 
could be imputed to Sony only if the Betamax recorders were incapable 
of substantial non-infringing use.65 The Court determined that time-
shifting (the practice of making temporary copies of shows for later 
viewing) was a sufficiently substantial non-infringing use, making liabil-
ity impossible.66 
 If Sony illustrates the type of knowledge insufficient to support 
contributory liability, a case like A & M Records v. Abdallah, a 1996 case 
from the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California, illus-
trates the kind of knowledge that supports it.67 In that case, the defen-
dant Abdallah sold time-loaded cassette tapes, which were ordinary 
blank cassettes that came with specified amounts of tape.68 Legitimate 
producers of music used these cassettes in order to eliminate long pe-
                                                                                                                      
60See Fonovisa, 76 F.3d at 264; Abdallah, 948 F. Supp. at 1456. 
61 See Yen, supra note 2, at 1873. 
62 464 U.S. at 419–20. 
63 Id. at 426 (noting that the trial court assumed that Sony had constructive knowledge 
of the likelihood that Betamax users would copy copyrighted programs). 
64 Id. at 439–56. 
65 Id. at 442. 
66 Id. at 456. 
67 948 F. Supp. at 1449. 
68 Id. at 1453. 
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riods of silence that might otherwise have occurred at the end of stan-
dard length cassettes. For example, a twenty-five minute piece of music 
would come with five minutes of silence if recorded onto a standard 
thirty minute cassette. A time-loaded cassette, however, would eliminate 
this inconvenience by providing enough tape for only twenty-five min-
utes of recording.69 Abdallah sold such time-loaded cassettes to people 
that he knew were producing counterfeit infringing recordings.70 In 
some cases, Abdallah himself timed the performances to be duplicated 
in order to manufacture the appropriate length cassette.71 When sued, 
Abdallah claimed that Sony protected him from liability because time-
loaded cassettes were capable of substantial noninfringing uses.72 The 
court rejected Abdallah’s claim because Abdallah knew much more 
about the infringing behavior he supported than Sony did.73 He knew 
the precise identities of the infringers, the actual works being infringed, 
and the ultimate use of the infringing copies.74 This level of knowledge 
clearly established Abdallah’s culpability, and liability followed.75 
 By way of contrast, a smaller number of courts have interpreted 
the knowledge requirement more generously, extending liability to de-
fendants with a general, as opposed to a specific, level of knowledge 
about infringement by others. For example, in the 2002 case, Perfect 10 
                                                                                                                      
69 Id. at 1453–54. 
70 Id. at 1454. 
71 Id. at 1455. 
72 Id. at 1456. 
73 Abdallah, 948 F. Supp. at 1456–57. 
74 Id. 
75 Id. Numerous cases adopt the limited approach to contributory liability identified 
here. See Matthew Bender & Co. v. West Publ’g Co., 158 F.3d 693, 706–07 (2d Cir. 1998) 
(finding defendant not liable even though “star pagination” in legal case reports could 
have allowed others to infringe plaintiffs’ copyrights); Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software Ltd., 
847 F.2d 255, 270 (5th Cir. 1988) (finding defendant not liable for selling software that 
facilitated copying of computer programs on disks protected by anti-copying technology 
despite knowledge that customers might commit copyright infringement); Faulkner v. 
Nat’l Geographic Soc’y, 211 F. Supp. 2d 450, 474–75 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (determining that 
sponsor of work containing infringing copies of photographs was not contributorily liable 
because sponsor made reasonable inquiry about possible infringement and received assur-
ances from primary infringer); Adobe Sys. Inc. v. Canus Prods., Inc., 173 F. Supp. 2d 1044, 
1056 (C.D. Cal. 2001) (holding that a letter complaining about infringement committed 
by apparently unidentified exhibitors at a computer show was insufficient to establish 
summary judgment for plaintiff on the issue of defendant’s knowledge); Livnat v. Lavi, 46 
U.S.P.Q.2d 1300, 1303 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (“[A]ssistance must bear a direct relationship to the 
infringing acts, and the contributory infringer must have acted in concert with the direct 
infringer.”); Demetriades, 690 F. Supp. at 294 (finding real estate broker not contributorily 
liable for selling land on which a house was built with the assistance of infringing architec-
tural plans). 
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v. Cybernet Ventures, the U.S. District Court for the Central District of 
California used contributory liability to grant a preliminary injunction 
against a third-party defendant that provided age verification services to 
a number of pornographic websites.76 The plaintiff in that case was Per-
fect 10, a magazine and website that owned copyright in a number of 
pornographic images.77 Unfortunately for Perfect 10, a number of web-
sites posted infringing copies of Perfect 10’s images.78 Many of these 
websites used the defendant Cybernet’s services to make sure that only 
those over the age of eighteen accessed materials.79 Perfect 10 sued and 
moved for a preliminary injunction, claiming that Cybernet was both 
vicariously and contributorily liable for the infringement of the websites 
using its services.80 With respect to contributory liability, Cybernet had 
a lower level of knowledge than Abdallah did. Perfect 10 may have in-
formed Cybernet that certain websites infringed, but Cybernet did not 
know the particulars of every act of infringement the way Abdallah 
did.81 Nevertheless, the court granted Perfect 10’s motion.82 
 Relaxing the interpretation of knowledge has potentially signifi-
cant consequences for contributory liability. Contributory liability is 
intended to measure a defendant’s culpability for knowingly support-
ing infringement. The more a defendant knows about the particulars of 
infringement, the more likely it is that she has unreasonably and culpa-
bly supported infringement. Conversely, if a defendant knows less, sup-
port will seem more reasonable. Accordingly, courts that impose liabil-
ity on lower levels of knowledge risk converting contributory liability 
from a fault-based cause of action to something approximating strict 
liability. For example, consider what would happen if a simple, unspeci-
fied complaint could establish knowledge. If this were so, an Internet 
                                                                                                                      
76 213 F. Supp. 2d 1146, 1169–71 (C.D. Cal. 2002). 
77 Id. at 1156–57, 1163. 
78 Id. at 1162. 
79 Id. at 1158–59. 
80 See id. at 1169–74 (discussing contributory and vicarious liability claims). 
81 Cf. Perfect 10, 213 F. Supp. 2d at 1169; Abdallah, 948 F. Supp. at 1454–55. 
82 Perfect 10, 213 F. Supp. 2d at 1193–94. Other cases reach similar results. See Napster, 
239 F.3d at 1021–22 (finding sufficient knowledge to impose contributory liability on the 
basis of “demonstrated infringing use of the Napster system”); Arista Records, Inc. v. Flea 
World, Inc., No. 03-2670 ( JBS), 2006 WL 842883, at *1 (D.N.J. Mar. 31, 2006) (granting 
summary judgment against operators of flea market for infringement committed by ven-
dors); UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Bertelsmann AG, 222 F.R.D. 408, 413–14 (N.D. Cal. 2004) 
(denying defendants’ motion to dismiss suit alleging that venture capital firm that took 
control of a company operating a file sharing network is liable for vicarious and contribu-
tory infringement); Sinnott, 300 F. Supp. 2d at 1000–01 (finding defendant liable for con-
tributory infringement). 
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service provider could be given knowledge by delivery of a complaint to 
a customer service representative in a shopping mall. Thus, even 
though a service provider might not reasonably be required to respond 
to such a complaint, the law of contributory liability might create liabil-
ity for failure to do so. This would be the equivalent of strict third-party 
liability because such notice could very easily be created by any copy-
right holder, and it would have the effect of increasing copyright’s chill-
ing effect on speech. Accordingly, the decision about whether to em-
brace the expansion of contributory copyright is of great significance to 
the construction of third-party copyright liability. 
C. Intentional Inducement 
 The 2005 U.S. Supreme Court case, Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios 
Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., established intentional inducement as the third and 
final cause of action of importance to this Article.83 In Grokster, the de-
fendants distributed software used to share files over the Internet on a 
“peer-to-peer” basis.84 Although people could use the software to share 
any type of file, most uses involved the sharing of copyrighted music 
files.85 The plaintiffs sued for vicarious and contributory liability, but 
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held for the defendants 
because the defendants’ software was capable of substantial non-
infringing uses.86 The Supreme Court vacated the court of appeals’ 
opinion and remanded the case.87 In so doing, the Court chose not to 
apply the standard formulations of vicarious and contributory liability 
described above. Instead, the Court opened a new branch of third-party 
copyright liability based upon intentional tort.88 The Court stated that 
defendants who intended to cause infringement could be held liable 
for the infringement of others, even if they distributed technology that 
had substantial non-infringing uses: 
Sony’s rule limits imputing culpable intent as a matter of law 
from the characteristics or uses of a distributed product. But 
nothing in Sony requires courts to ignore evidence of intent if 
there is such evidence, and the case was never meant to fore-
close rules of fault-based liability derived from the common 
                                                                                                                      
83 See Grokster, 545 U.S. at 936–37. 
84 Id. at 919–20. 
85 Id. at 922–23. 
86 Id. at 927–28. 
87 Id. at 941. 
88 Id. at 934–35. 
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law. . . . Thus, where evidence goes beyond a product’s charac-
teristics or the knowledge that it may be put to infringing 
uses, and shows statements or actions directed to promoting 
infringement, Sony’s staple-article rule will not preclude liabil-
ity.89 
 The Court then noted that the record contained ample evidence 
that the Grokster defendants wanted others to use their technology to 
infringe and remanded the case for further fact finding.90 In so decid-
ing, the Court made it clear that inducement applies to defendants 
who behave in a highly culpable manner, and that the cause of action 
does not include simply acting with the general knowledge that others 
may infringe: 
[M]ere knowledge of infringing potential or of actual infring-
ing uses would not be enough here to subject a distributor to 
liability. Nor would ordinary acts incident to product distribu-
tion, such as offering customers technical support or product 
updates, support liability in themselves. The inducement rule, 
instead, premises liability on purposeful, culpable expression 
and conduct, and thus does nothing to compromise legitimate 
commerce or discourage innovation having a lawful promise.91 
 For purposes of this Article, it is important to understand that 
there are now two separate bases on which to find a third-party copy-
right defendant liable on a fault basis. First, there is contributory in-
fringement, which measures the defendant’s culpability by evaluating 
her action in light of knowledge about another’s infringement. Second, 
there is also now inducement, which measures a defendant’s culpability 
by the object of her intent. As will later be shown, the differences be-
tween inducement and contributory liability can, from a First Amend-
ment point of view, affect the kinds of damages recoverable by a copy-
right plaintiff.92 
D. Copyright Damages 
 A brief description of copyright damages completes our tour of 
third-party copyright liability. Plaintiffs can recover two distinct forms of 
monetary damages under the Copyright Act: The first is ordinary com-
                                                                                                                      
89 Grokster, 545 U.S. at 934–35. 
90 Id. at 924–26. 
91 Id. at 937. 
92 See infra notes 94–133 and accompanying text. 
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pensatory damages that require plaintiffs to prove any financial harm 
he or she has suffered or profits enjoyed by the defendant because of 
infringement.93 The second is presumed damages, which plaintiffs can 
elect in lieu of ordinary damages.94 Plaintiffs do not need to offer spe-
cific proof of harm or profit to recover presumed damages. Rather, a 
court may set the amount of those damages as it sees fit within a range 
of $750 to $30,000 per infringement.95 If the defendant’s infringement 
was willful, the court may increase the amount to $150,000 per in-
fringement.96 If the defendant’s infringement was innocent, the court 
may decrease the amount to as little as $200 per infringement.97 
II. The First Amendment and Third-Party Copyright Liability 
 The foregoing makes it possible to describe concisely the present 
organization of third-party copyright liability and some of the interpre-
tive challenges that courts face.98 In a nutshell, there are three causes of 
action for third-party copyright liability that correspond to three major 
forms of tort liability. Vicarious liability corresponds to strict tort liabil-
ity.99 Contributory liability corresponds to negligence.100 Intentional 
inducement corresponds to intentional tort liability.101 Plaintiffs who 
sue successfully under these causes of action may choose between ordi-
nary compensatory damages and presumed damages.102 
 Presently, courts face two primary interpretive challenges when 
applying these causes of action. First, as noted earlier, it is possible to 
construe vicarious liability to hold a broad range of defendants liable 
without fault for infringement committed by others.103 Doing this could 
decrease the amount of copyright infringement committed, but it 
would also increase copyright’s chilling effect on speech. Second, it is 
possible to interpret contributory liability so that relatively low levels of 
knowledge expose defendants to potential liability.104 In some cases, 
this level of knowledge is sufficiently low to effectively transform con-
                                                                                                                      
93 17 U.S.C.§ 504(a)(1) (2006). 
94 Id. § 504(c). 
95 Id. § 504(a)(2). 
96 Id. § 504(c)(1). 
97 Id. § 504(c)(2). 
98 See supra notes 16–97 and accompanying text. 
99 See supra notes 20–53 and accompanying text. 
100 See supra notes 54–82 and accompanying text. 
101 See supra notes 83–92 and accompanying text. 
102 See supra notes 93–97 and accompanying text. 
103 See supra notes 45–52 and accompanying text. 
104 See supra notes 76–82 and accompanying text. 
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tributory liability from a fault-based cause of action to a strict liability 
cause of action.105 This would also potentially stop more copyright in-
fringement at the cost of greater chilling of speech. 
 To see the First Amendment implications of these interpretive 
challenges in more detail, a good place to start is the framework cre-
ated by the U.S. Supreme Court in 1964, in the line of cases led by New 
York Times Co. v. Sullivan and Gertz v. Robert Welch.106 These cases govern 
the relationship between libel law and the First Amendment,107 a rela-
tionship that is reasonably similar, though certainly not identical, to the 
one between copyright and the First Amendment. Like copyright, libel 
restricts speakers in order to advance a private interest. Copyright cre-
ates a private right of action to protect commercial interests that en-
courage the production of creative works. Libel creates a private right 
of action to protect an individual’s interest in reputation.108 Equally 
important, both libel and copyright have the potential to chill speech 
because mistakes are made when enforcing them and potential defen-
dants cannot always be sure whether they are subject to liability. 
 The Supreme Court’s reaction to the chilling effect associated with 
libel is instructive to those thinking about third-party copyright liability. 
At the time of Sullivan, common law libel held speakers strictly liable 
for false and defamatory statements.109 Moreover, common law allowed 
plaintiffs to recover for, among other things, presumed damages with-
out proof of pecuniary injury.110 The Court recognized that this com-
mon law scheme created constitutionally objectionable risks of self-
censorship.111 The Court noted that the fear of damage awards, particu-
larly those granted without proof of actual pecuniary loss, could 
frighten speakers more than criminal prosecution might frighten 
speakers.112 Granted, in theory there would be no conflict if libel de-
terred only those spreading falsehoods, because the dissemination of 
                                                                                                                      
105 See supra notes 45–52 and accompanying text. 
106 Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. 418 U.S. 323 (1974); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 
376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
107 See Gertz, 418 U.S. at 325; Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 256. 
108 See Gertz, 418 U.S. at 341 (“The legitimate state interest underlying the law of libel is 
the compensation of individuals for the harm inflicted on them by defamatory falsehood.”). 
109 376 U.S. at 267 (explaining that the only defense to publication of libelous state-
ments is truth). 
110 Id. (noting that “general damages are presumed, and may be awarded without 
proof of pecuniary injury”). 
111 Id. at 279. 
112 Id. at 277–78. 
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falsehoods does not serve First Amendment interests.113 The Court, 
however, noted that liability against the disseminators of all falsehoods 
affected the dissemination of true statements as well: 
Allowance of the defense of truth, with the burden of proving 
it on the defendant, does not mean that only false speech will 
be deterred. . . . Under such a rule, would-be critics of official 
conduct may be deterred from voicing their criticism, even 
though it is believed to be true and even though it is in fact 
true, because of doubt whether it can be proved in court or 
fear of the expense of having to do so. They tend to make only 
statements which “steer far wider of the unlawful zone.”114 
The Court then concluded that the common law of libel could not 
constitutionally impose strict liability against the speaker of any false-
hood concerning a so-called “public official.”115 Instead, such liability 
could exist only if a speaker acted with “actual malice,” namely knowl-
edge of falsity or reckless disregard for the truth.116 
 In 1974, Gertz v. Robert Welch offered the Court the chance to ex-
pand the First Amendment response to the chilling effect of libel.117 In 
Gertz, the plaintiff was a lawyer—not a public official—who won a ver-
dict of $50,000 on a strict liability basis from the publisher of a false and 
defamatory statement.118 The district court, however, entered a judg-
ment notwithstanding the verdict on the ground that the Sullivan stan-
dard should have governed the case.119 This allowed the Supreme 
Court to consider how, if at all, the constitutional limits identified in 
Sullivan applied in cases with plaintiffs who were not public officials.120 
The Court decided that the First Amendment did limit these actions, 
but that the precise limit depended on the identity of the plaintiff, the 
defendant’s culpability, and the type of damages sought.121 
                                                                                                                      
113 See Gertz, 418 U.S. at 340 (“[T]he erroneous statement of fact is not worthy of con-
stitutional protection . . . .”). 
114 Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 279 (internal citation omitted). 
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117 418 U.S. at 325. 
118 Id. at 328–29. 
119 Id. at 325. 
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121 Id. at 342–47. 
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 For all actions by public figures, namely those holding public of-
fice and others of significant notoriety, recovery of any type could exist 
only upon a showing of actual malice.122 For actions by non-public fig-
ures, the rules are more complicated. As an initial matter, no recovery 
is possible unless the plaintiff can show that the defendant behaved 
negligently or worse.123 Plaintiffs who prove only negligence, however, 
can recover only proven compensatory damages.124 If a plaintiff wants 
to recover presumed damages, she must prove that the defendant acted 
with actual malice.125 
 Sullivan and Gertz establish a general constitutional preference for 
free speech over remedies for libel.126 The common law rule applying 
strict liability to speakers of all false and defamatory statements does 
not work perfectly. Some libel would go unremedied, and some true 
speech would get suppressed. One might argue that the judicial system 
would make these errors in roughly equal amounts, and that a bal-
anced approach to the tension between libel and free speech should 
accept this distribution of errors as an appropriate tradeoff. This is, 
however, precisely what the Supreme Court rejected. By making it 
harder for plaintiffs to win libel cases, the Court embraced the princi-
ple that errors against free speech are worse than errors permitting li-
bel.127 In other words, the First Amendment establishes that it is better 
to allow more libel to go unremedied in order to protect free speech 
than it is to lose free speech in order to prevent or remedy libel. 
 This preference should be extended to copyright. After all, courts 
deciding copyright cases will make errors similar to those made in libel 
cases. And again, one could argue that a fair balance accepts a roughly 
equal split between errors against speech and errors failing to remedy 
infringement. If the Supreme Court considered free speech more im-
portant than perfect enforcement of private actions in libel, however, it 
would seem to follow that free speech is more important than private 
                                                                                                                      
122 Id. at 342–43. 
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124 Id. at 350. 
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127 Cf. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 347–48; Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 279–80. 
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actions in copyright. If this logic is correct, then it makes sense to con-
sider whether, at least in some cases, the Constitution requires substan-
tive changes in copyright. And indeed, it turns out that third-party 
copyright liability imposes liability in ways that Sullivan and Gertz con-
sidered problematic in the context of libel. 
 First, the application of vicarious liability is problematic because it 
is a form of strict liability.128 Before Sullivan and Gertz, libel was a strict 
liability cause of action, but those cases now limit libel by requiring the 
plaintiff to show that the defendant acted with fault.129 If this logic is 
applied to vicarious copyright liability, it seems reasonable to conclude 
that, at the very least, the aggressive expansion of vicarious liability 
adopted by some courts violates the First Amendment. One might be 
tempted to say that the application of vicarious liability should be en-
tirely unconstitutional as a form of strict liability, but such a conclusion 
would probably be unwarranted. Gertz did say that courts could not im-
pose libel liability without fault.130 It seems unlikely, however, that the 
Gertz Court meant to eliminate respondeat superior from libel, and in-
deed, contemporary employers face liability for libel committed by 
employees within the scope of their employment.131 
 Additionally, Sullivan and Gertz cast doubt upon expansive inter-
pretations of contributory liability. If courts follow the suggestion made 
above and limit the application of vicarious copyright liability to respon-
deat superior, then contributory liability will govern the vast majority of 
third-party copyright liability cases. If courts interpret contributory li-
ability’s elements of knowledge and material contribution as a method 
of establishing fault, there would appear to be no conflict with the First 
Amendment because plaintiffs would have to prove fault in order to 
recover. If, however, courts begin interpreting knowledge in such a way 
that contributory liability slides toward strict liability, they will create a 
conflict with Sullivan and Gertz because plaintiffs will be able to recover 
without proving fault. 
 Second, and perhaps even more strikingly, Sullivan and Gertz have 
something to say about the imposition of damages in third-party copy-
right liability cases. A major component of copyright’s chilling of 
speech comes from the possibility of presumed damages. For example, 
a service provider like the video-sharing website YouTube hosts many 
                                                                                                                      
128 See supra notes 20–52 and accompanying text. 
129 See supra note 123 and accompany text. 
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131 See, e.g., Mullinax v. Miller, 531 S.E.2d 390, 393 (Ga. Ct. App. 2000) (noting that the 
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instances of infringing content, but also many non-infringing uses of 
copyrighted works. When copyright holders complain to YouTube, 
thereby putting the company on notice for purposes of contributory 
infringement, YouTube must decide whether to capitulate to the copy-
right holder’s demand to remove the alleged infringement or allow the 
use to remain. A meaningful part of this calculation is the cost of mis-
takenly failing to remove content that a court determines to be in-
fringement. In many cases, the actual monetary loss to the copyright 
holder is small. A home video that uses copyrighted music in the back-
ground does not represent any meaningful likelihood of lost revenue 
to the copyright holder, and YouTube’s financial risk would be fairly 
limited if the copyright holder had to prove damages by a preponder-
ance of evidence. Presumed damages, however, radically change this 
calculation. Now, YouTube can no longer calculate that risk is low be-
cause the copyright holder can elect presumed damages that can run as 
high as $30,000 per infringement.132 Such damages, even if the likeli-
hood is low, are no laughing matter, especially when thousands of simi-
lar uses probably exist on YouTube’s servers at any given time. This 
problem is reasonably similar to the dilemmas faced by libel defendants 
before Sullivan and Gertz. 
 The constitutional solution from libel is applicable to third-party 
copyright liability. Under Sullivan and Gertz, a libel plaintiff cannot re-
cover presumed damages unless the defendant acted deliberately or 
with reckless disregard for the truth.133 If this limit were applied to 
third-party copyright liability, a plaintiff could recover presumed dam-
ages only from defendants who commit intentional inducement or con-
tributory infringement rising beyond fault to recklessness. Although 
this may seem jarring at first, a sensible result would follow. If a service 
provider like YouTube gets a complaint of an infringing use, it would, 
as a matter of likely current practice, investigate the complaint. If the 
investigation reveals a clear case of infringement, YouTube’s failure to 
remove the infringing content would support presumed damages—if 
the plaintiff elected them—because such failure to remove a clear case 
of infringement would be at least reckless. If the investigation revealed 
a debatable case of infringement, however, such as a possible fair use 
defense, YouTube’s failure to remove the posted content could support 
only proven compensatory damages, not presumed damages, because 
YouTube’s failure to remove such content is at best negligent. 
                                                                                                                      
132 See 17 U.S.C. § 504(c) (2006). 
133 See supra notes 122–125 and accompanying text. 
2009] A First Amendment Perspective on Third-Party Copyright Liability 1501 
Conclusion 
 This Article has applied a First Amendment perspective to the con-
struction of third-party copyright liability. In so doing, it has paid par-
ticular attention to the elevated risk of chilling non-infringing speech 
posed by third-party copyright liability. It then argued for a particular 
construction of third-party copyright liability that prevents this chilling 
effect from rising to constitutionally objectionable levels. This construc-
tion would include limiting vicarious copyright liability to the reach of 
respondeat superior, making sure that contributory liability remains an as-
sessment of the defendant’s fault and not a form of strict liability, and 
limiting the availability of presumed damages to cases of intentional in-
ducement or reckless contributory liability. 
 It is, of course, possible to object to the suggestions made here. If 
nothing else, judicial reluctance to subject copyright to serious First 
Amendment scrutiny casts doubt on whether courts would actually use 
the First Amendment to impose the construction laid out here. More-
over, copyright and libel may raise similar First Amendment issues, but 
the differences may prove constitutionally significant. Indeed, although 
third-party copyright clearly chills some speech, it is possible that 
enough instances of arguable infringement are unaffected by this chill-
ing effect because the relevant actors are simply unaware of copyright. 
Moreover, it is possible that, in some cases, copyright holders do not ag-
gressively enforce their copyrights in ways that would significantly chill 
speech. For example, YouTube hosts many apparent infringements that 
copyright holders seem not to complain about. 
 Even if it turns out, however, that the First Amendment does not 
require the construction of third-party copyright liability suggested 
here, this Article raises issues that courts should consider. If nothing 
else, the application of First Amendment principles to third-party copy-
right liability exposes the relationship between such liability and the 
chilling effect on free speech, and it points the way to interpretations of 
law that are appropriately sensitive to First Amendment values. 
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